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Abstract 
 
To test the claim that correct performance on unexpected transfer false belief tasks 
specifically involves mental state understanding, two experiments were carried out 
with children with autism, intellectual disabilities and typical development.  In both 
experiments, children were given a standard unexpected transfer false belief task 
and a mental-state-free, mechanical analogue task in which participants had to 
predict the destination of a train based on true or false signal information.  In both 
experiments, performance on the mechanical task was found to correlate with that of 
the false belief task for all groups of children.  Logistic regression showed that 
performance on the mechanical analogue significantly predicted false belief task 
performance even after accounting for the effects of verbal mental age. The findings 
are discussed in relation to possible common mechanisms underlying correct 
performance on the two tasks. 
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Understanding the Mind or Predicting Signal-Dependent Action? 
Performance of Children  with and without Autism  on Analogues of the False 
Belief Task 
 
 It is now well established that three year old typically developing children fail 
unexpected transfer tests of false belief such as that used by Wimmer and Perner 
(1983). In these tasks, children are asked to predict the behaviour of a protagonist 
who thinks an object is in one location when it really is in a different one.  Despite the 
consensus on the findings, there is still considerable debate over why children 
should experience such difficulty.  
 
 Theorists such as Perner (1991) argue that young children find it hard to 
understand the representational nature of mental states.  That is, pre-school 
children, although they can understand that perceptual access to an event results in 
an individual’s becoming aware of that event, cannot understand that a person’s 
knowledge can become out-dated by changes in events that were not witnessed by 
the individual concerned.  Perner’s evidence shows that it is not until their fifth year 
that children become aware of the fact that other people’s mental states are 
representational, i.e. that they can bear true or false relation to reality.  This 
development by four-year-old children of an understanding of the representational 
nature of mental states such as beliefs is often referred to as their acquiring a ‘theory 
of mind’.  This account was by Zaitchik’s (1990) findings on the false photograph 
task.  This task involves an experimenter placing an object in one location and taking 
a photograph of it.  The object is then moved to another location, and the child is 
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asked ‘In the picture, where is the object?’. Zaitchik found that similar 
proportions of children passed this task as passed the false photograph task and 
concluded that what developed during the child’s fifth year was an understanding of 
representations in general, and not just mental representations.  
  
 Numerous attempts have been made to provide explanations for why children 
acquire such an understanding of representations. Frye, Zelazo and colleagues 
(Frye, Zelazo & Burack, 1998; Frye, Zelazo & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo, Burack, 
Benedetto & Frye, 1996, Zelazo, Burack,  Boseovski, Jacques & Frye, 2001; Zelazo 
& Frye, 1998, see also Perner & Lang, 2002 and Perner, Stummer & Lang, 1999 for 
a critique) have advocated an approach that views the development of a 
representational ‘theory of mind’ as a specific consequence of the operation of 
domain-general processes.  They argue that once children understand that when ‘if-
then’ rules are hierarchically embedded, successful resolution of, inter alia, 
unexpected transfer false belief tasks becomes possible.  In such tasks, the 
statements forming the two rules are ‘[protagonist] knows where marble is’ and ‘I 
[child] know where marble is’. The difficulty, according to Frye and Zelazo is that 
younger children have difficulty hierarchising these statements into a structure 
whereby one acts as a setting condition for the other, a difficulty that is not restricted 
to situations involving mental state reasoning.  Frye et al. (1995) report a study in 
which children had to predict the direction a marble would take down a covered ramp 
depending on whether a lamp was lit or not. Three-year-old children always 
predicted that the marble would follow the path dictated by gravity, whereas four-
year-olds could modulate their predictions according the state of the light. Moreover, 
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a strong correlation was found between performance on this task and 
performance on an unexpected transfer false belief task. This finding was replicated 
by Zelazo, Jacques, Burack and Frye (1996) using children with Down syndrome 
and, in a study of children with autism, Zelazo et al. (2002) also report strong 
correlations between false belief task performance and the ramp task, as well as with 
a dimensional change card sorting task, which requires children to sort cards 
according to colour or shape depending on the experimenter’s instructions.  Younger 
children with typical development and children with autism (both characteristically 
false belief failers) found it hard to shift sorting dimension in response to the 
experimenter’s instructions. Although they could sort red and blue triangles and 
circles according to a pair of rules such as ‘if this is red, put it in the red pile, if it is 
blue, put it in the blue pile’, they found it hard to switch to putting triangles with 
triangles and circles with circles when asked to do so by the experimenter. Frye and 
Zelazo conclude from these studies that failure on false belief tasks is but one 
example of a more general executive failure to switch flexibly between rules. In their 
Cognitive Complexity and Control Theory, Zelazo and Frye (1998,  Zelazo et al., 
2001) argue that such flexibility is the result of increased psychological distancing 
from the problem that enables greater conscious control to be exercised over 
complex problems.   
 
 The theme of executive processes as contributing to performance on false 
belief tasks has also been explored by Russell (1996, 1998a,b). Russell starts from 
the observation that individuals with autism, who generally experience difficulty on 
unexpected transfer false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), are 
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impaired compared to controls on some tasks of executive function but not on 
others. Tasks that show impairments include the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, the 
Tower of Hanoi and its variants (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994), whilst unimpaired 
performance has been found on the stroop task (Bryson, 1983).  Russell (1998b) 
argues that what distinguishes those executive tasks on which individuals with 
autism are successful from those on which they are not is the question of arbitrary 
rules; individuals with autism perform poorly on tasks that contain both arbitrary rules 
and require the inhibition of a prepotent  response.  So, they are impaired on a task 
where successful retrieval of a marble from a box has to be preceded by the arbitrary 
act of throwing a switch on the side of the box (Hughes & Russell,1993) or by turning 
over a cup placed beside the apparatus  (Biró & Russell, 2001).   The requirement to 
perform a non-arbitrary act such as removing an obstacle did not impair 
performance. 
 
 In applying this analysis to False Belief and False Photograph tasks, Russell 
concludes that the rules linking the elements of these two experimental scenarios do 
not bear an arbitrary relation to the events narrated, thereby lessening the executive 
demands of the tasks. But, Russell argues, although the two tasks contain aspects 
that might elicit prepotent responses (i.e. there is a current reality that conflicts with a 
representation of a past reality), this conflict is stronger in the case of false belief 
than false photograph tests. It is this weaker conflict between actual and represented 
reality that explains why children with autism are far more successful on tests of 
false non-mental representations such as out-of-date photographs (Leekam & 
Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) or out-of-date drawings  (Charman & Baron-
  
6  
 
Cohen, 1992), all of which have the same logic as Zaitchik’s false photograph 
task described earlier.  
 
 The décalage between the false belief and false photograph performance of 
children with autism has formed the basis of an alternative, more domain-specific, 
modularist view of the development of an understanding of mind.  Starting from  
Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) observation that mental state understanding either fails 
to develop or is markedly delayed in children with autism, Baron-Cohen (see Baron-
Cohen, 1995) concludes that children with autism lack a ‘theory of mind’, that is, that 
they are specifically impaired in their understanding of mental states.   Baron-Cohen 
(1995) further argues that this impairment was specific to mental states because 
even those children with autism who fail false belief tasks have little difficulty with 
tests of non-mental representation (see above). 
 
 The mental state specificity argument proposed by Baron-Cohen is based on 
two assumptions.  The first is that unexpected transfer false belief tasks and 
Zaitchik’s (1990) out-of-date or ‘false’ photograph task are equivalent in all respects 
except for their mental state content.  The second is that the unexpected transfer 
false belief task is an unambiguous measure of mental state understanding. 
However, a consideration of the structures of the two tasks calls these assumptions 
into question.  Whereas false photograph tasks involve the experimenter, an object, 
two locations and a representation of the object, false belief tasks typically involve 
the experimenter, two protagonists, an object and two locations.  Moreover, the child 
has to take into account the behaviour of the protagonists towards the object. The 
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false photograph task involves fewer elements and actions than the false belief 
task and so can be regarded as less complex and therefore less demanding on the 
child.  Furthermore, whilst unexpected transfer tasks can undoubtedly be thought of 
as measures of mental state understanding, they can also be conceptualised in a 
way that makes no reference whatsoever to mental states. They can be viewed in 
terms of an agent’s goal-directed behaviour that is mediated not by the state of the 
goal, but by a device that can truly or falsely signal the state of the goal to the agent 
(see Table 1). In the typical Sally-Anne version of the unexpected transfer scenario 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), we have an Agent (Sally) who behaves towards a 
particular Goal (marble), which can be in one of two locations (in the box or in the 
basket).  Each of these two locations can be registered by a Signal (Sally’s belief), 
which determines the Agent’s (Sally’s) behaviour towards the Goal (Marble) and 
which, in turn, is determined by the location of the Goal.  The state of Sally’s belief 
(the Signal) is usually, but not necessarily congruent with the location of the Goal. 
So, when the Signal and the location of the Goal are in conflict (i.e. when Sally 
believes something that is not actually true), then we would predict that a signal-
dependent agent (Sally) should obey the Signal (her belief) and not the location of 
the Goal.  So a child who passes such a test has to grasp three things: that agents 
act towards goals, that these acts can be mediated by signals and that such signals 
can be false. 
 
 If the above analysis of false belief tasks is true, then it would follow that any 
task that was consistent with that analysis should correlate highly with performance 
on the Sally-Anne false belief task.  Moreover, any such correlation would weaken 
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the argument that passing false belief tasks involves specifically an 
understanding of mental states. Such a correlation would implicate an understanding 
of the behaviour of agents towards objects, which Leslie (1987, Leslie & Roth, 1993) 
have argued is necessary for the understanding of other minds. It would also imply 
an understanding that behaviour in relation to a goal can be mediated by a signal 
that truly or falsely represents the state of that goal.  But it would not limit such 
understanding specifically to mental states.  On the other hand, the implications of 
failing to find a correlation would depend on the precise pattern of results obtained.  
A random pattern of responses would indicate that children failed to understand the 
task and higher or lower performance on the analogue task would suggest that it was 
assessing different capacities from those assessed by the false belief tasks. A 
similar set of arguments holds for the case of autism. In particular, a significant 
correlation between the two tasks would suggest that the delay or failure to master 
false belief tasks seen in this population may not be due to a specific deficit in mental 
state understanding but rather to a more general difficulty with systems involving 
signal-dependent agents. 
  
 This analysis of unexpected transfer tasks in terms of Agents, Signals and 
Goals may also help to explain why  false belief and false photograph tasks are 
correlated in typically developing children yet not correlated in children with autism.  
Both tasks entail a grasp of a signal truly or falsely representing a goal, but only the 
false belief task entails an agent acting on the basis of this information.  It may be 
the case that typically developing children understand both these aspects of the 
problem, whereas children with autism understand only the first – i.e. they fail to 
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understand agents’ goal-directed behaviour.  As a consequence, they perform 
well on tasks involving a false signal (e.g. false photograph tasks) but poorly on 
those that require the prediction of agents’ behaviour (e.g. false belief tasks). 
 
Experiment 1 
 To test the possibility that failure on false belief tasks may simply be the result 
of a difficulty in prediction of an agent’s goal-directed behaviour on the basis of 
incorrect information signalling the state of the goal, we developed a mechanical 
analogue of the standard, unexpected transfer false belief task (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  In this task, children had to predict the behaviour of 
a mechanical system that used signal information about an event on which that 
system had to act (see right-hand column of Table 1).  We predicted that if 
performance on the standard, unexpected transfer false belief task depends on an 
ability to predict an agent’s behaviour on the basis of signal information, then there 
should be a strong correlation between the analogue task and the standard false 
belief task. Failure to find a correlation between the two tasks would be consistent 
with the idea that there is a specific mental state component to false belief tasks.  
We also predicted that if children with autism have a specific deficit in understanding 
mental states, then their performance on the mechanical analogue would be 
uncorrelated with false belief task performance. 
Method 
Participants 
 There were three groups of participants: children with autism, children with 
moderate intellectual disabilities and typically developing children. The children with 
  
10  
 
intellectual disabilities were included to control for the fact that children with 
autism frequently are of lower IQ than typically developing children.  The children 
with autism all had a diagnosis of autism according to DSM III-R criteria ascertained 
from school records and from direct observations by the first author.  Children with 
intellectual disabilities were excluded if there was any mention of autism or autistic-
like behaviour on the school records of if there was any present-state evidence of 
autistic social impairment. The typically developing children and those with 
intellectual disabilities were all selected from nursery and special schools in London. 
All but 13 of the children with autism were selected from special schools in London 
and the south-east of England. For all these children, verbal mental ages were 
measured using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS, Dunn, Dunn, Whetton 
& Pintillie, 1982). The remaining children with autism, five of whom had French as a 
first language were selected from a school in Montreal. Verbal mental ages for these 
children were measured using  a French-language version of the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test and appropriate test procedures and norms. Details of chronological 
and verbal mental ages are set out in Table 2.  One-way ANOVAs revealed a 
significant difference for Chronological age only  (F (2, 64) = 76.74, p < 0.001).  Post-
hoc Scheffé tests revealed significant pair-wise differences in chronological age for 
all three pairs of groups.  
 
 Because the present study was designed to investigate correlations between 
two tasks, it was important to avoid both ceiling and floor effects in performance on 
the two measures. To avoid such effects, participants from all three groups were 
selected so as to have a reasonable spread of passers and failers on the Sally-Anne 
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task consistent with good matching on verbal mental age.  This selection was 
done by means of a process of progressive inclusion, whereby the group pass and 
fail rates on the Sally-Anne task were evaluated from time to time. When there 
appeared to be a preponderance of passers on this task (> 75%),  additional children 
with lower VMAs were recruited.  When failers were in a majority, children with 
higher VMAs were selected.  All this selection was carried out  without regard to  
performance either on the Sally-Anne or theTrain task, and resulted in the verbal 
mental age of the typically developing group being a marginally lower and that of the 
autism group marginally higher than that of the other two groups.  
 
Equipment 
  The Sally Anne false belief task was administered using two small dolls 
and a box, basket and marble.  The mechanical analogue (Train task) used the 
equipment pictured in Figure 1.  The apparatus, which measured 108 by 60 cm was 
built using 0-gauge model railway track and consisted of a model airport with two 
landing pads, one coloured yellow and one blue, as well as one passenger terminal. 
Each landing pad was surrounded by a nine cm high wall painted in the same colour 
as the pad, and could be covered by a lid of the same colour.  A fully automatic, 
driverless shuttle conveyed goods from terminal to aircraft. At first the shuttle 
followed a single path from the terminal but some way from the terminal the track 
divided and the route to be taken was signalled by a yellow or blue light activated by 
the plane landing on the yellow or blue pad respectively.  A console under the 
experimenter’s control regulated train movements and points and signal operations. 
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Procedure 
Train Task 
 Initially, children were tested using the scenario pictured in Figure 1 to ensure 
that they had understood that a plane landing on yellow caused the yellow light to 
show and that a yellow light showing meant that the shuttle headed for the yellow 
pad etc.  It was emphasised to the children that the train was fully automatic, had no 
driver and relied on the signal to determine which direction it should take. 
 
 Once children had demonstrated that they reliably understood these features 
of the system by making five correct predictions out of six trials, the experimenter 
(unknown to the child) switched the mechanism relating the yellow and blue lights to 
the landing pads so that when a plane now landed on the yellow pad, a blue signal 
light came on and vice versa .  This change was accompanied by expressions of 
surprise by the experimenter who pointed out the contrast between the colour of the 
location of the plane and that shown by the light.  At this point, the experimenter 
covered the landing pads with their lids and switched off the signal light.  Children 
were then asked to predict where the shuttle would go, given that the yellow light 
was showing and that they could see that a plane had landed on the blue pad. Once 
they had answered the prediction question, children were also asked about the 
location of the plane and the colour of the light. One trial was given, with the colour 
of the pad counterbalanced across children.  The text of the instructions given to the 
children can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Sally-Anne Task 
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 All children were also given one trial on a version of the Sally-Anne 
unexpected transfer, false belief task used by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) to assess 
understanding of false belief, with the location of the marble counterbalanced across 
children. The test question used here was ‘Where will Sally look for her marble?’ and 
was followed by reality and memory control questions in counterbalanced order.  
Order of administration of Sally-Anne and Train tasks was counterbalanced across 
children.  The instructions given to the children are in the Appendix. 
 
Results 
 On both tasks, children were included only if they correctly answered the 
Reality and Memory control questions on the Sally Anne task and the Plane Location 
and Colour of Light question on the Train task.  Four typically developing children, 
six with intellectual disabilities and five children with autism were excluded because 
they failed one or more control questions.  The Sally-Anne task was scored by 
assigning 0 for a fail and 1 for a pass.  For the Train task, it was decided to assign 0 
if a child made a ‘plane’ response and 1 if a ‘light’ response was made. ‘Plane’ and 
‘light’ are used here rather than pass/fail because it is less clear in this task that one 
or other option could be considered as genuinely successful.  The results of the data 
analyses are the same whichever way the data are coded.  
 
 The data were tested first for sampling and order effects, followed by 
between-group, within-task comparisons using chi-square tests.  A series of within-
group, between task tests were performed in order to explore associations between 
the tasks using the Phi test, as well as to compare the difficulty of the two tasks 
using the McNemar test.  Finally, to examine the relative contributions of the Train 
  
14  
 
task and verbal mental age to Sally-Anne performance, we carried out a logistic 
regression analysis. 
 
 To test for the effects of order on task performance, a series of chi-square 
tests was carried out on the numbers of passers and failers on each task in each 
counterbalancing group separately for each group of participants. All comparisons 
were non-significant (χ2 < 1.05). Comparison of the UK and Montreal children with 
autism on CA, VMA and the two experimental tests revealed no significant 
differences between these two groups justifying their inclusion in a single sample.  A 
set of pair-wise, between-group comparisons were carried out on the Sally-Anne and 
Train pass and fail rates that are set out in Table 3.  In all cases χ2 < 1, indicating 
similar patterns of performance in the three groups and the proportion of Sally-Anne 
task failers in the autism group, at 33%, is in line with earlier studies (see Happé, 
1995). 
 
 Set out in Table 4 are the within-group cross-tabulations of pass and fail rates 
on the Sally-Anne and Train tasks.  Inspection of these data show that both tasks are 
strongly correlated in all three groups of children (all Φ-values >0.55) and that the 
two tests are also of equal difficulty (all McNemar tests ns).  Both these observations 
strongly support the rationale behind the development of the Train task and the 
contention that this task is a good analogue of the Sally-Anne false belief task for all 
three groups of participants.   
 
 In view of the strong relation between verbal mental age and performance on 
false belief tasks reported by Happé (1995), a series of correlations between 
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performance on the two experimental tasks and BPVS age-equivalents were 
calculated.  A significant correlation was found between Verbal Mental Age and 
performance on the Sally-Anne task (r = 0.28, N = 67, p < 0.05), but not for the Train 
task (r = 0.22, N = 67, ns) .  In view of this correlation, a logistic regression analysis 
was carried out to test the extent to which scores on the Train task predicted Sally-
Anne scores for all the children used here after the effects of verbal mental age had 
been removed.  As verbal mental age has been demonstrated by previous research 
to correlate with false belief task performance (Happé, 1995), we followed Field 
(2000) and entered this variable on the first step of the regression analysis.  
Inclusion of BPVS age-equivalent significantly improved the predictive power of the 
constant-only model (χ2 (1, N = 67) = 5.20, p < 0.03 ) yielding successful 
classification rate of 60%.  Addition of the Train task data in the second step of the 
model further improved the power of the model (χ2 (1, N = 67) = 28.92, p < 0.01) and 
increased the successful classification rate to 85%.  Regression statistics for BPVS 
age-equivalent were β = 0.04; Wald z-ratio = 2.3, ns; Odds Ratio = 1.04.  The 
corresponding values for the Train task score were β = 3.20; Wald z-ratio =  21.61, p 
< 0.01; Odds Ratio = 24.44. Inspection of the Wald criterion scores shows that 
performance on the Sally-Anne task is reliably predicted only by the Train task data. 
 
 Diagnostic statistics from the regression analysis revealed a good fit between 
the model and the data.  Five children (two with typical development, two with 
intellectual disabilities and one with autism) who passed the Sally-Anne task  were 
mis-classified as failers by the regression model and a further five children (one with 
typical development, one with intellectual disabilities and three with autism) who 
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failed the task  were mis-classified as passers.  The remaining 57 children were 
correctly classified. All Cook’s distances were <1.00, a value which Howell (1997, 
p.535) suggests as a cut-off value for outliers.  Only one leverage value was greater 
than twice the average value, a level normally taken to be a measure of outliers 
(Hoaglin & Welsch, 1978 cited in Field, 2000).  In addition, none of the DF-beta 
values for the constant or the two predictor models exceeded 1.1. 
 
 Discussion of Experiment 1 
 The finding of a significant association between the two tasks for all three 
groups of participants supports the initial rationale behind the development of the 
Train task and suggests that the two measures tap some underlying capacity to 
understand how the behaviour of an agent towards one event can be influenced by 
another event that can stand in true or false relation to the first.  The absence of any 
mention of belief, the absence of people from the Train scenario make it unlikely that 
the cognitive capacity common to both tasks entails an understanding of mental 
states. 
 
 The lack of significant differences in Table 3 between either the typically-
developing children or those with intellectual disabilities and the children with autism 
appears to contradict existing research in which impairment in the last group is the 
rule (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). However, the success rate of the children with 
autism (33%), although high by comparison with some studies, does lie within the 
range reported in other studies (see Happé, 1995). These pass rates on the Sally-
Anne task that are lower than usual for the typically-developing children and higher 
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than usual for the children with autism are partly due to the sampling strategy 
described earlier on, which was designed to achieve a reasonable spread of Sally-
Anne task passes and failers in all three groups. 
 
 Although the findings of the present experiment are consistent with the view 
that failure to understand false beliefs in individuals with autism may not be the result 
of an impairment of a mechanism specific to the understanding of mental states,  
there is one respect in which the Train task is not an exact analogue of the Sally 
Anne task.  In the latter task, the event that engenders Sally’s false belief is Anne’s 
transfer of the marble.  In the Train task, there is no event that is an exact 
counterpart of this action.  Failure to include this element of the task may have made 
the Train task easier than it would otherwise be, and so have contributed to 
artefactual correlations between the two tasks.  To overcome this possible source of 
error, we developed a modification of the Train task for use in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
 The points raised in the discussion of Experiment 1 prompted a re-design of 
the procedure used in Experiment 1.  The aim was to include an explicit event 
corresponding to Anne’s transfer of the marble in the Sally-Anne test that sets up the 
conflict between the location of the plane and the state of the signal  It is possible 
that the omission of this element from the Train task made it easier than the Sally-
Anne task thus making the correlations found in Experiment an artefact of the 
procedure rather than a genuine finding. 
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Method 
Participants 
 Eighteen children with autism and 25 typically developing children were 
selected from nursery and special schools in the Greater London area.  Selection 
criteria were the same as those used in Experiment 1 and no child took part in both 
experiments.  Because there were no differences between the children with autism 
and the children with intellectual disabilities in Experiment 1, a group of the latter 
children was not recruited for this experiment.  Details of chronological ages and 
verbal mental age equivalents, measured by the BPVS are set out in Table 5.  
Separate independent-sample t-tests revealed no significant difference between the 
two groups on VMA (t < 1) but a significant difference on CA (t (41) = 8.98, p < 
0.001). 
 
Equipment 
  The Sally-Anne false belief task was administered using two small dolls 
and a box, basket and marble, exactly as in Experiment 1.  The Train task used the 
same equipment as used in Experiment 1 with the addition of a small toy bird. 
 
 
Procedure 
Train Task 
 The initial familiarisation procedure and criterion used here were identical to 
those in Experiment 1.  However, on the test trial, as the plane was about to land on 
the yellow (or blue) pad, a small bird landed there first, thereby activating the yellow 
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(or blue) light.  The experimenter then pointed out that the bird was stopping the 
plane from landing on that pad and that it would have to go and land on the other 
one.  The plane was then made to land on the other pad.  The signal light continued 
to show the colour of the first pad.  The experimenter then pointed out that the plane 
was on one colour while the signal showed the other. Each child was given one trial, 
with choice of landing pad counterbalanced across children. Children were then 
asked, in counterbalanced order, to indicate the actual location of the plane and the 
colour that the light had been showing. 
 
 Sally-Anne Task 
 All children were also given one trial on the same Sally-Anne task used in 
Experiment 1.  The order of presentation of the Train and Sally-Anne tasks was 
counterbalanced across children. 
 
Results 
 The same scoring procedures and data analytic strategy was used as in 
Experiment 1.  Unfortunately, systematic records were not kept of the numbers of 
children excluded because of incorrect answers to control questions, so these 
cannot be reported here. To test for the effects of order of presentation on task 
performance, a series of four chi-square tests were carried out between order of 
presentation and score on each of the two tests, separately for the two groups of 
participants.  In all cases χ2 < 1 indicating that the order of testing did not affect 
performance on either test. 
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 Pair-wise between-group comparisons of pass and fail rates on the Sally-
Anne and Train tasks set out in Table 6 indicate similar patterns of performance in 
both groups (in all cases χ2 < 1).  The proportion of Sally-Anne task passers in the 
autism group, at 50%, is higher than that reported in other studies, but must be taken 
in the context of the sampling issues mentioned in the discussion of Experiment 1. 
 
 Set out in Table 7 are the within-group cross-tabulations of the Sally-Anne 
and Train tasks.  Inspection of these data show that both tasks are strongly 
correlated in both groups (both Φ-values >0.58) and that the two tests are also of 
equal difficulty (both McNemar tests ns).  These observations replicate the findings 
of Experiment 1 and strongly support the rationale behind the development of the 
Train task and the contention that this task is a good analogue of the Sally-Anne 
false belief task for both groups of participants.   
 
 For the same reasons as in Experiment 1, correlations were calculated 
between performance on the two experimental tasks and BPVS age-equivalents.  
Both values were significant (Sally-Anne task: r = 0.32, N = 43, p < 0.05; Train task, r 
= 0.41, N = 43, p < 0.01). A logistic regression analysis was then carried out using 
the same procedure as in Experiment 1.  Inclusion of BPVS age-equivalent on the 
first step significantly improved the predictive power of the constant-only model (χ2  
(1, N = 43) = 4.85, p < 0.03 ) yielding successful classification rate of 65%.  Addition 
of the Train task data in Step 2 further improved the power of the model (χ2 (1, N = 
43) = 15.62, p < 0.01) and increased the successful classification rate to 84%. 
Regression statistics for BPVS age-equivalent were β = 0.14; Wald z-ratio = 0.16, 
  
21  
 
ns; Odds Ratio = 1.01.  Corresponding values for the Train task were β = 3.10; 
Wald z-score = 11.92, p < 0.001; Odds Ratio = 22.13.  In replication of Experiment 1, 
the Wald criterion scores indicate that performance on the Sally-Anne task is reliably 
predicted only by the Train task data. 
 
 As in Experiment 1, diagnostic statistics from the regression analysis showed 
that the model fitted the data well.  Four children (two from each group) who failed 
the Sally-Anne task were predicted as having passed the task and three children (all 
with typical development) who passed were predicted as having failed.  Predictions 
for the remaining 36 children were in line with their actual test performance. All 
Cook’s distances were <1.00, three leverage values were greater than twice the 
average value and none of the DF-beta values for the constant or the two predictor 
models exceeded 1.5. 
 
Discussion of Experiment 2 
 By replicating the findings of Experiment 1, the results of the second 
experiment reinforce the validity of the rationale behind the construction of the Train 
task.  The addition of a step in the Train task corresponding to Anne’s displacement 
of the marble in the Sally-Anne task did not affect the overall thrust of the results. 
This finding further reinforces the conclusion that what is important in this task is the 
mis-match between the location of the plane and the colour of the light indicating that 
location.  The fact that in both experiments, the Sally-Anne false belief task 
correlated highly with an entirely mechanical task, irrespective of the diagnosis of the 
children, suggests that failure on the former task may not be due to a specific failure 
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to understand mental states but rather some more general difficulty in 
understanding signal-mediated behaviour. Although the correlational data presented 
here do not permit the inference of direction of cause between tasks, (see Colvert, 
Custance & Swettenham, 2002 for a discussion of correlation issues in relation to 
false belief tasks) there are aspects of the two tasks and of the data that allow some 
speculations to be made.  These will be discussed in the next section. 
 
General Discussion 
  The main findings of the two experiments reported here are that it is possible 
to devise experimental scenarios on which children perform in a way that correlates 
highly with their performance on false belief tasks despite the former having no 
explicit mental state content. There are three possible explanations of the 
correlations reported here between the Sally-Anne and Train tasks. Either the first 
causes the second, the second causes the first or they are both caused by a third 
factor or set of factors. To make the first argument, that is to assert that an 
understanding of mental states, or the possession of a ‘theory of mind’ is necessary 
in order to pass the Train task is to come close to the ideas of Perner (1991), who 
would argue that the signal in the Train task is a representation of the plane’s 
location, and that only children who understand the representational nature of the 
signal (i.e. that it can mis-represent the location of the plane) will pass the task.  
However, such an argument reduces the problem in both tasks to one of 
representation in general, rather than one specifically of mental states.  But children 
with autism typically perform much better on tests of understanding of non-mental 
representation such as false photographs or maps (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992; 
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Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) than they do on false belief 
tasks. By extension, if the problem were simply one of understanding non-mental 
representations, children’s performance on the Train task used here should have 
been better than on the Sally-Anne task. 
 
 In defence of findings that show superior performance by children with autism 
on false photograph tasks over false belief tasks, Perner (1993) has argued that 
such children are generally older than the typically developing controls and thereby 
have had more experience of cameras and photographs.  In the present context, 
such an argument would explain the equivalent performance of the children with 
autism and typically developing children on the Train and Sally-Anne tasks in terms 
of equivalent experience with signal-dependent trains.  But apart from having an 
unsatisfactory post-hoc feel to it, such an argument also seems to ignore the fact 
that all children (whether with or without autism) are likely to have had far more 
experience of people than cameras or toy trains and thus should perform better on 
tests of false belief than on tests of artifactual false representation such as false 
photographs or drawings.  The fact that they do not suggests that an analysis in 
terms of representation may not be the most appropriate to explain either the present 
findings or those from false photograph studies. 
  
It can also be argued that the correlations between the two tasks reflect their 
common mental state content on the basis of a Thomas the Tank Engine factor1.  
Throughout, we have argued that the Train task does not require any mental state 
                     
1 We are grateful to Greg Currie for bringing this objection to our attention. 
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understanding for its solution.  But children may well either assume that the 
train has a driver, or that it has a personality of its own, thus making it a test of 
understanding mental states and rendering any correlation with the Sally-Anne task 
unsurprising and theoretically uninteresting.  Although it is true that trains and their 
drivers figure strongly in the cultural environment of children and that many of the 
participants used here may well have known of Thomas the Tank Engine, it is 
unlikely that these factors influenced the findings of the present study.  First, it had 
been strongly emphasised to children that the train had no driver to see where the 
plane had landed and that a signal was needed to indicate which direction to take.  
Second, the training procedure, in which the experimenter made the train travel to 
and from the actual location of the plane using a control box with switches and 
knobs, reinforced the mechanical nature of the set-up. This procedure made the 
scenario resemble a 'Scalextric' car-racing toy rather than something inhabited by 
person-like entities.  Third, the train engine used was a model of a modern electric 
locomotive, devoid of the characteristic features (e.g. a highly differentiated front and 
back, round features on the front that might suggest a face) that would prompt the 
attribution of personality.  But the most important evidence against attribution of 
personality to the train lies in the data.  If children had assumed either that the train 
had a driver or that it had its own personality, they would never have predicted that 
the train would have followed the signal, because the location of the plane was 
clearly visible from the starting point of the train.  It can be objected that many 
children did just that, namely that they predicted that the train driver would ignore the 
signal and head for the actual location of the plane.  But such an objection needs to 
explain why it was only the Sally-Anne failers who did this.  Sally-Anne passers did 
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not.  To account for this pattern in the data, a proponent of the Thomas the 
Tank Engine argument would need to explain how the acquisition of an 
understanding of false belief results in children no-longer attributing personality to 
the train - a sort of reverse 'theory of mind'.  Further evidence on this point could be 
gained from asking children to justify their choice of responses on the two tasks to 
see whether they made mental state attributions on the Train task.  It might also be 
useful to devise a scenario using animated coloured shapes or blocks that had a 
similar logical structure to that of the train task.  Whether or not children would make 
sense of such abstract scenarios is an open question. 
 
 Related to the Thomas the Tank Engine factor is a more general argument  
that both tasks used here are simply alternative measures of ‘Theory of Mind’ and 
that children confronted with either of them will respond according to their level of 
development in that domain.  Such an argument leads to the prediction that the two 
tasks would be strongly correlated and of equal difficulty – precisely the findings 
reported here.  But such an argument seems to stretch the domain of ‘mind’ beyond 
what might reasonably be thought of as the realm of mental phenomena.  If we were 
to accept this argument, then we would have to accept that signal-dependent 
systems of goal-directed action are ‘mental’ systems.  The conjecture made in this 
paper is that ‘mental’ systems are a subset of signal-dependent goal-directed 
systems and that when children understand one system,  they should automatically 
understand the other. 
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 If, however, we restrict our conception of mind to unobservable, 
hypothetical entities in the heads of persons, then there are two other ways in which 
possession of a ‘theory of mind’ could be thought of as the causal factor in passing 
the Train task.  If we assume that ‘theory of mind’ capacity once developed then gets 
applied, by analogy or some other process, to situations not involving mental states, 
we would predict a number of specific patterns in the data. Because performance on 
the Train task would depend on the application of ‘theory of mind’, i.e. would be 
developmentally secondary to theory of mind, we should expect performance on the 
Train task to be worse than that on the Sally-Anne task.  However, inspection of the 
data in Tables 4 and 7 shows that this is not the case for any group in either 
experiment. Moreover, if successful performance on the Train task required an intact 
‘theory of mind’, then responses on this task by Sally-Anne task failers should be 
distributed randomly between the plane and the light and, additionally, not all Sally-
Anne passers should choose the light, because some passers would not yet have 
learned to apply their mentalising skills to non-mental situations.  Inspection of 
Tables 4 and 7 supports neither of these possibilities. A significant proportion of 
Sally-Anne failers in all these groups chose the plane rather than the light, and a 
significant proportion of Sally-Anne passers (over 80% in each case) chose the light. 
 The corresponding figure for the children with autism from Experiment 1 (75%) was 
not significant, but was nevertheless a majority and may have been affected by 
sampling considerations that yielded a relatively low number of false belief passers 
in this group.  Once a sample of children with autism with a higher false belief pass 
rate was recruited, as in Experiment 2, a similar effect to the other groups was found. 
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 To make the reverse of the argument just presented, namely to assert 
that an understanding of signal-dependent behaviour of agents causes an 
understanding of false belief would make the opposite predictions from those just 
outlined.  So, we would expect the responses of children who chose the plane to 
pass or fail the Sally-Anne task in equal numbers, and for a substantial number of 
those who chose the light to continue to fail the Sally-Anne task.  Inspection of 
Tables 4 and 7 reveals none of these eventualities in the data. 
 
 A further possibility to account for the correlation between the two tasks is that 
they both depend on some common factor.  In view of Happé’s (1995) meta-analysis 
of factors that influence performance on false belief tasks, the most obvious 
contender in this respect is verbal mental age.  However, although the correlational 
analyses show that verbal mental age correlates with False Belief task performance 
in Experiment 1 and with both tasks in Experiment 2, the logistic regressions show 
that the two experimental tasks are still correlated with each other when the effects 
of verbal mental age were partialled out. Another possible common factor is the 
ability to disengage from salient reality in the context of an arbitrary rule (Russell, 
1996).  In the present two scenarios, someone looking for a marble will go to where 
the marble is, and a train that picks up goods from a plane will travel towards the 
plane. This account would suggest that the Train task requires  participants to 
disengage from a salient reality (the current location of the plane) in the context of a 
rule (if the light is yellow, then go to the yellow pad...), thereby making the task as 
difficult as the false belief task.  If this account is true, then manipulations of the 
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salience of the plane or the signal as well as the changing arbitrariness of the 
rule linking the signal to the location of the plane should alter success rates on this 
task. 
  
 According to the analysis of the Train and Sally-Anne tasks in terms of signal-
dependent, goal-directed behaviour  presented earlier, it is plausible to argue that 
the factor common to the two tasks is an ability to manipulate information about the 
state of the goal, the state of the agent and the mediating signal that conveys 
information to the agent about the state of the goal.  Although we have not 
conclusively established that an agent is a necessary component of this system, we 
will use that term for any entity that can change state systematically in response to 
state changes in another entity.  The crucial factor here is that we have three binary-
state elements, with the state of the first (the goal) being mirrored by the second (the 
signal) but with the possibility of such mirroring being wrong, and a third which 
changes in response to changes in the first on the basis of information provided by 
the second.  On this analysis, children’s difficulty with false belief is not specific to 
understanding mental states, but rather, is a more general information-processing 
deficit involving the manipulation of contingent information from more than two 
sources in a way that allows the state of a third element of the problem to be 
predicted.   
 
 The work of Frye, Zelazo and colleagues (Frye et al., 1988; 1995; Zelazo & 
Frye, 1998; Zelazo et al., 1996; 2001; 2002) on embedded conditional reasoning 
described earlier is consistent with the analysis just presented.  In their dimensional 
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change card sorting test the child has to consider in which of two locations to 
place an object based on two other binary sources of information (shape versus 
colour game and either circle/triangle or red/blue). It is possible to conceptualise the 
Train task used here in embedded conditional terms.  A single pair of rules could be 
either ‘If the plane is on blue, then the train goes to blue; if the plane is on yellow, the 
train goes to yellow’.  A similar pair of rules operates for the yellow and blue lights.  
The setting rule, analogous to Frye and Zelazo’s colour/shape game instruction, 
would be ‘If the colour of the light and the colour of the landing pad where the plane 
is are the same, then use the first pair of rules; if they are different, use the second.  
If this analysis were correct and conditional rule use is a common factor underlying 
performance on Frye and Zelazo’s tasks, false belief tasks and the Train task used 
here, then we would predict strong inter-correlations among these tasks for all 
groups of participants used here. 
 
 Another account of false belief understanding in terms of the manipulation of 
complex information has appeared in the literature in recent years, which has 
aspects similar to the analysis just outlined.  Halford (1993, 1996, Halford, Wilson & 
Phillips, 1998) argues that all problems can be analysed in terms of their processing 
complexity, defined as ‘... the number of interacting variables that must be 
represented in parallel to perform the most complex process involved in the task...’ 
(Halford et al., 1998, p. 805).  Halford and his colleagues argue that cognitive 
development involves a progression from an ability to process single elements 
(unary) through two-element relations (binary) to three-element relations (ternary) 
and beyond.  Successful resolution of false belief tasks involves an understanding of 
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ternary relations by the successful co-ordination of pairs of binary relations. 
According to this view, younger children (and most children with autism) have little 
difficulty in understanding any binary relationship between Sally and the location of 
her marble. That is to say that they can grasp either that ‘Sally thinks her marble is in 
the box’ or ‘Sally thinks her marble is in the basket’.  They experience difficulty, 
however, when they have to decide between these two relationships on the basis of 
an event that transforms one into the other – in this case, whether or not Sally saw 
the marble being moved. Although Halford provides numerous empirical examples 
from outside the area of mental state understanding in support of his theory, so far, 
none has been developed in the context of false belief understanding.  The studies 
described here, although conceived in ignorance of Halford's theory, provide 
evidence that is consistent with it. 
  
 Whichever of the accounts just outlined turns out to be true, the further 
question of what it is that is different about the children with autism who, even when 
they pass higher-level tests of ‘theory of mind’, remain autistically socially impaired 
(Bowler, 1992; 1997; Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt, 1998).  Related to this is the question of 
why children without autism who can not process information in the way described in 
the previous paragraphs are not autistic.  One possibility that has been raised by a 
number of authors in the context  (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Happé, 1994) of the first 
point is that individuals with autism are delayed in their acquisition of these abilities 
and that they never ‘catch up’ to a normal level of social functioning.  However, 
empirical support for such a conjecture is mixed.  The results of the present study 
lend some tentative support.  Inspection of Tables 2 and 5 shows that the mean 
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verbal mental age of the children with autism is  10 months (Experiment 1) and 
six months (Experiment 2) higher than that of the controls, which confirms the finding 
by Happé (1995) of a higher mean VMA needed to pass false belief tasks by such 
children . 
 
 The fact that typically-developing children who fail the Sally-Anne task are not 
autistically socially impaired suggests that this task, and by implication, the three-
element schema outlined earlier on is only part of the explanation for normal social 
functioning, and prompts a consideration of other possible elements in the process.  
Leslie’s (1987; Leslie & Roth, 1993) two-step account of the development of false 
belief understanding may be of relevance here.  Leslie has argued that the capacity 
to generate agent-centred and possibly counter-factual representations develops in 
infancy and enables pretence, whereas the mechanism that enables the prediction of 
behaviour on the basis of false belief (the SP mechanism) does not emerge until 
about four years of age. It is possible that the three-element schema outlined here is 
a candidate for the internal workings of the SP.  If this is so, then what is lacking in 
children with autism is, as Leslie and Roth (1993) and Leslie and Thaiss (1992) point 
out, an understanding of agent-centred representations.  Two strands of evidence 
lend support to this conjecture.  The first is from Tables 3 and 7, which show similar 
levels of performance by children with autism on the mental-state, “agent-ful” Sally-
Anne task and the non-mental-state, “agent-ful” Train task.  It will be remembered 
that children with autism typically do better on “agent-less” non-mental-state tasks 
(false photographs or maps) than on false belief tasks (Leekam & Perner, 1991; 
Leslie & Thaiss, 1992).  So the inclusion of an agent brings the performance of 
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children with autism on non-mental-state tasks back to the level of their 
performance on false belief tasks.  This argument would make the prediction that 
children with autism would perform better on an “agent-less” system that operated on 
the three-element schema than they would on Sally-Anne type false belief tasks.   
 
 A second strand of evidence that suggests that children with autism have problems 
understanding agents comes from a study by Bowler and Thommen (2000), who 
asked such children together with controls matched on VMA, CA and IQ to describe 
a short animated film developed by Heider and Simmel (1944).  In the film, three 
animated (self-propelled) geometric shapes interact with each other and with a static 
rectangle.  Analysis of children’s descriptions of the film revealed that the children 
with autism were delayed in their ability to describe relations between an animate 
character and the inanimate object.  Moreover, they were worse than all the control 
groups at describing actions between two animate objects when they did not come 
into contact (e.g. a chase).  These findings suggest that children with autism fail to 
notice certain events in their environments that help to build up an understanding of 
the relations among agents and between objects and agents and thus have 
difficulties on all tasks including the two used here, where agents’ goal-directed 
actions have to be predicted.  Such a failure to understand the actions of agents at a 
distance is in line with the developmental symptomatology of autism (e.g. absence of 
protodeclarative pointing, see Mundy, Sigman & Kasari, 1993).  Moreover, the strong 
contingency between the two tasks in the two experiments reported here supports 
their having a common element such as agency.  Like the argument developed in 
the previous paragraph, this account makes the prediction that the performance of 
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children on “agent-less” tasks would be better than on “agent-ful” ones.  The 
suggestion the problem faced by children with autism on false belief-type tasks 
resides in difficulty with the comprehension of the behaviour of agents also helps to 
resolve the discrepant correlations observed in this group and in typically developing 
children between false belief and false photograph tasks.  Whereas ability to 
succeed on both tasks comes on line at the same time for typically developing 
children, children with autism can pass false photograph (“agent-less”) before they 
can pass false belief (“agent-ful”) tasks. 
 
  To conclude, the findings of the present investigation suggest that the failure 
of children with autism on unexpected transfer false belief tasks is unlikely to be due 
to a specific deficit in the understanding of mental states but rather, that such 
understanding may be a sub-set of comprehending specific types of complex 
situation.  Although the present findings do not provide an unambiguous specification 
of such situations, they do narrow the set of possibilities down to a grasp of complex 
reasoning or of agency, or to a combination of the two.  Complex reasoning may 
involve Halford’s (1993) notion of ternary relations, or Zelazo and Frye’s (1998) 
concept of hierarchically embedded rules.  Alternatively, it may involve the executive 
processes of simultaneous disengagement from a salient object coupled with the 
operation of an arbitrary rule, as Russell (1998a) advocates.  Further studies are 
needed to decide among these possibilities. 
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Appendix 
Sally-Anne Test Used In Experiments 1 and 2 
Here we have two dolls.  One is called Sally and the other, Anne.  This is Sally and 
this is Anne. 
Can you show me Sally and show me Anne? 
Sally puts her marble in the box, and then she goes out for a walk.  While she is out 
Anne takes the marble from the box and moves it over to the basket. 
Now Sally has come back from her walk. 
Sally was then brought back into the scene and made to stand at an equal distance 
from the box and the basket. 
Test Question: Where will Sally look for her marble? 
Reality Question: Where is the marble now? 
Memory Question: Where did Sally leave her marble at the start? 
 
Train Task 
Training phase (Experiments 1 and 2). 
Here is a model airport. Let me show you how it works.  Here, we have two landing 
pads, a blue one and a yellow one.  These are where the plane lands – like this.  
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The experimenter makes a plane land on each pad in turn. 
Can you show me the blue pad.  Now show me the yellow one.  Down here we have 
a train that takes things from the plane to the train shed.  This train is automatic.  It 
doesn’t have a driver.  There is no-one to see where the plane has landed, so there 
is a signal here…  
Experimenter points to signal lights  
…to show the train where to go.  When a plane lands on the blue pad, the blue light 
comes on.  That means that the train goes to the blue pad, like this.  
Experimenter makes the train go to the blue pad and repeats the demonstration for 
the yellow pad/light.   
Now the plane lands on the yellow pad.  See - the yellow light comes on.   
Where will the train go to? 
 
Test phase (Experiment 1). 
If the child responds correctly on at least five of the training trials, the experimenter 
presses a switch to change the contingency between the landing pads and the lights. 
Now the plane comes in to land on the yellow pad.  Oh! Look!  The blue light has 
come on.  The plane’s on the yellow pad but the blue light is on. 
The experimenter then switches off the lights and covers up the landing pads. 
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Test Question: Where will the train go to? 
Reality Question: Where is the plane now? 
Memory Question:  What colour did the light show? 
 
Test phase (Experiment 2). 
As in Experiment 1, testing continues only if the child responds correctly on at least 
five of the training trials. 
Now the plane comes in to land on the yellow pad.  Oh! Look!  Here comes a bird – 
it’s landing on the yellow pad! See, the yellow light has come on. The plane will have 
to go to the blue pad.   Now the plane’s on the blue pad but the yellow light is on. 
The experimenter then switches off the lights and covers up the landing pads. 
Test, reality and memory questions as in version for Experiment 1. 
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Table 1  
Comparative analysis of false belief and mechanical analogue tasks. 
 
 
    Sally-Anne   Train 
    Task    Task 
 
Agent    Sally    Train 
 
Goal    Marble   Plane 
 
Signal    Sally's belief   Light indicating 
    about location  location of 
    of marble   plane 
 
“False belief”   Sally holds wrong  Signal light wrongly 
situation   belief about location  indicates location 
    of marble   of plane 
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Table 2 
Chronological and verbal mental ages of the three groups of children who participated in Experiment 1. 
  
      Chronological Age (Months)       BPVS1 Age (Months) 
     
Group    M   SD   Range     M   SD  Range 
 
Typically  
Developing    50.86   4.89   41- 57     50.41     9.97  30- 67 
 (N = 22)    
 
With Intellectual 
Disabilities   154.38  26.46  103-213    57.10   13.64  40- 92 
(N = 21) 
 
With 
Autism    127.13  40.52   71-213    61.21   27.43   35-156 
(N = 24)  
1 British Picture Vocabulary Scale
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Table 3 
Performance of children from the three groups on both tasks in Experiment 1. 
  
       Test 
 
 Sally-Anne  Train 
 
 
 
 
 
Fail 
 
Pass 
  
Chooses 
Plane 
 
Chooses 
Light 
Group 
 
Typically 
Developing 
 
 
 
   11 
 
 
  
  11 
  
 
 
   12 
 
 
   
 10 
 
With 
Intellectual 
Disabilities 
 
 
   11 
 
 
  10 
  
 
   12 
 
 
   9 
 
With 
Autism 
 
 
   16 
 
 
    8 
  
 
   15 
 
 
   9 
 
 
Typically Developing vs With Autism: Sally Anne χ2  (1, N = 46) = 0.72, ns; Train χ2  (1, N = 
46) = 0.06, ns 
 
Typically Developing vs With Intellectual disabilities: Sally-Anne χ2 (1, N = 43) = 0.00, ns; 
Train χ 2 (1, N = 43) = 0.00, ns 
 
With Autism vs With Intellectual disabilities: Sally-Anne χ2 (1, N = 45) = 0.45, ns; Train χ2  (1, 
45) = 0.00, ns 
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Table 4: 
Relations between performance on the two tasks in Experiment 1 for the three 
groups of children. 
 
 
 
 
Group                   Sally-Anne 
           Train      
Chooses      Chooses 
Plane             Light 
 
 
Typically 
Developinga 
 
Fail 
 
10 
 
  1 
 
Pass 
 
  2 
 
  9 
    
 
With 
Intellectual 
Disabilitiesb 
 
Fail 
 
  10 
 
  1 
 
Pass 
 
  2 
 
  8 
    
 
With 
Autismc 
 
Fail 
 
13 
 
  3 
 
Pass 
 
  2 
 
  6 
 
a  Significant correlation between measures (Φ = 0.73, p < 0.001), no significant 
difference in difficulty between measures (McNemar: ns). 
 
b  Significant correlation between measures (Φ = 0.72, p < 0.002), no significant 
difference in difficulty between measures (McNemar: ns) 
  
c  Significant correlation between measures (Φ = 0.55,  p < 0.006), no significant 
difference in difficulty between measures (McNemar: ns).  
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Table 6 
Performance of children from the two groups on both tasks in Experiment 2. 
 
 
      Test 
 
  
Sally-Annea 
  
Trainb 
 
 
 
Group 
 
 
Fail 
 
 
Pass 
  
 
Chooses 
Plane 
 
 
Chooses 
Light 
 
Typically 
Developing 
 
 
9 
 
 
16 
  
 
10 
 
 
15 
 
With 
Autism 
 
 
9 
 
 
9 
  
 
7 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
a   No significant difference between groups (χ2 (1, N = 43) = 0.37, ns)  
b  No significant difference between groups (χ2  (1, N = 43) = 0.00,  ns) 
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Table 7 
Relations between performance on the two tasks in Experiment 2  for the two groups 
of children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Group              Sally-Anne 
 
             Train 
 
Chooses       Chooses 
Plane              Light 
 
 
Typically 
Developinga 
 
Fail 
 
  7 
 
   2 
 
Pass 
 
  3 
 
 13 
    
    
 
With 
Autismb 
 
Fail 
 
  7 
 
    2 
 
Pass 
 
  0 
 
    9 
 
a  Significant correlation between measures (Φ = 0.58, p < 0.005), no significant 
difference in difficulty between measures (McNemar: ns). 
 
b  Significant correlation between measures (Φ = 0.80,  p < 0.001), no significant 
difference in difficulty between measures (McNemar: ns) 
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Figure 1   
 
Apparatus used in Experiment 1. 
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